“In the Red” – Formation of a (Consumptive) Identity

March 24th, 2010 by vonsteig

“The reshaping or accessorizing of the external self, along with a commercialization of the spirit, was now touted as a way of enhancing China’s unique spiritual civilization.”

This stood out to me because it seemed, in many ways, that conspicuous consumption, having taken the place of asserting individual liberties in the early 80’s due to the machinations of the Party apparatus, was now seen as a fast-track to self-fulfillment and self-awareness. As Barme calls it, “lifestyle consumerism.” A type of  convoluted understanding seems to be forming in Barme’s text. That is, when the Party deferred the powerful public outcries in the “market of ideas” into the “stock-market,” the people of China began expressing their newfound freedom through the developing capitalist-oriented economy. And while many have succeeded in achieving a form of self-fulfillment through this new economic paradigm, the Party is using this vehicle of economic freedom in an attempt to control the development of consumerist lifestyles.

My question is when will this tightly-controlled economic freedom, which pushes “lifestyle consumerism,” no longer suffice as a legitimate way to express choice and individuality for the Chinese people?

“Streetlife: There’s a Million Parts to Play..”

March 15th, 2010 by vonsteig

“The contemporary reification of Mao is no longer anchored in the Party. The Party must now fight for the ownership of his body and image so that it can have a chance of ‘ownership’ over the collective soul.”

This quote initially got my attention for a simple enough reason: it reminded me of the dangling Mao-ornament in the limo at the end of “In the Heat of the Sun.” As the author states earlier in the text, the growing consumer culture in China both affirms and undermines the power of the Party apparatus. This dichotomy between the Party and the masses is seen throughout the text, one specific instance being in the discussion of reform. The idea of reform is much different than the act of reform. And, as the Chinese Communist takeover has proven, a constant state of reform and revolution (often becoming revolution for the sake of revolution; that is, instigating uprisings then aiming the power of the populace at an enemy or goal, meanwhile fostering a nasty case of nationalism) makes for poor living conditions. On page 27, this idea of a government “testing” reform on the people while the people test the government to see how much reform they are willing to instigate speaks to the underlying issue of control. Control not just of people, but of the ideas underlying the Chinese state, the philosophical ideas that are often condensed (and some may say forgotten) when Mao, once China’s white knight, becomes a grandfatherly dashboard ornament, or when reform becomes a two way street. Who controls China? I think the answer is becoming harder to answer.

My question then, is simple: Is the rise of a Chinese consumerist base (as exemplified in the Mao ornaments) indicative of a larger tug of war between the Party and the People? And if so, how will the Party deal with a class that demands goods and is beginning to take harness the debate, both economically and (possibly) politically?

Hung’s “A Caveat.”

March 12th, 2010 by vonsteig

“Given the great imbalance of the Chinese economy and the delay in its sociopolitical restructuring, China is increasingly vulnerable to any protracted global economic slump that can curtail China capability of exporting its excess capacity to the world. “

Given the current economic crisis, this quote (as well as a few others) stuck out to me specifically as I read this text. It stuck in my mind, most likely, because, as Hung suggests, China has already started to recover from a substantial slump in their export industry. According to  BusinessDay, China’s exports rose for the third straight month, up 46% in February:
 http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Co…

As Hung made clear, there is very little worry that China doesn’t have the ability to bounce back from even the deepest of recessions. And yet China’s continued growth proves problematic, especially considering that 30% of their exports are consumed by the United States. The relationship between the U.S. and China has become a truly symbiotic one, with the fate of one dependent on the other. The more America purchases, the more China can sell. Yet any protracted economic crisis that drives Americans to forgo their consumerism will have a negative effect on China’s production. Such a lag could possibly produce, as Hung suggests, an “overaccumulation crisis,” goods are devalued, prices plummet, and the “sluggish domestic demand” will evolve into a true economic crisis in China.

Thus, even though China is growing by leaps and bounds, even in the face of world-wide economic downturn, how can their persistent growth be sustained with the spectre of overaccumulation looming?

Applebaum’s “Big Suppliers in Greater China”: If you Give a Mouse a Cookie…

March 10th, 2010 by vonsteig

“The example of TAL provides one illustration of this trend. In some cases, this shifting of key functions has even meant the migration of many pre- and postproduction functions, including design, warehousing, and control over logistics, to Asia…”

Of all the assigned readings, this portion of the first readings was the part that most captured my interest. We hear from the news constantly of the “Chinese Menace,” and the “Growing Chinese Economic Monster,” as if, as we sleep, Chinese workers, clothed in red, are slowly climbing into our homes, stealing our livelihoods with chopsticks, escaping into the night, and whatever xenophobic scare tactics the media can throw at us.

But the truth is, China has nothing in terms of American business that we haven’t gladly handed over on a silver platter. It makes for good television, but the truth is, the American consumerist desire for cheap goods has driven us hand over (in many cases, anyway) every aspect of production and development, except for the “selling” part. As Applebaum states about the relationship between the Chinese-based TAL and the U.S. based JCPenny, many American companies have purposefully handed over every aspect of the production of goods to foreign companies, which provide cheap labor, cheap production costs, and in many cases, cheap design and housing costs.

The problem occurs when that Chinese company, having grown by leaps and bounds thanks to U.S. investment, can afford to simply create their own products and sell them cheaply to Chinese consumers. Because the Chinese populace has yet to transform into a consumer class, the current paradigm continues to maintain itself. However, if and when the Chinese people become, like their Western counterparts, hell-bent on consuming goods and services, the world of production and and consumption of U.S. good will be sent for a loop as close to a billion individuals descend on cheaply produced good at home.

So  as American politicians and pundits continue to  harp on the growing fears of the Chinese economic menace, someone had better take a moment and look in the mirror. Because honestly, who do you think had a hand in creating it?

Rethinking the Chinese Development Miracle QQC

March 8th, 2010 by vonsteig

“Despite the rapid growth of the private sector, it has not severed its ties to the state sector. Instead, the private sector has numerous links with the state sector.”

This reading from Hung’s book “China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism” confirmed a suspicion of mine that i’ve had for some time, and the above quote illustrates it perfectly. In this chapter, Hung outlines 7 key changes that China has undertaken which shirk the western neoliberalism model of economic development. One of the post striking is the continued involvement of the centralized state in private sector development. It seems to me that China, in many ways, has the best of both worlds. Like the west, China has a large working class, developed industry, foreign investment, and private enterprises. However, unlike the west, China’s private sector and state sector have an almost symbiotic relationship (a relationship that the west views as almost parasitic), the aforementioned working class is not a hell-bent on consumption, and the western capitalist model is replaced by a strong centralized state that has a direct, overarching say in private industry. China, in other words, gets to have their economic cake and eat it to.

My question, however, is how and in what ways has this economic model, while unquestioningly successful, supplanted individual and corporate freedoms?

Balibar’s “The Nation Form: History and Ideology” and the Cultural Revolution

February 22nd, 2010 by vonsteig

Of social movements in a “nation-state,” Balibar says this: “[they] must at one and the same time be a mass phenomenon and a phenomenon of individuation.” Balibar goes onto suggest that this two-pronged approach to maintaining any form of revolution or social change need not be couched in complicated political dogma. Instead, “primary,” basic forces are far more effective. Simple “love” and “hate,” “citizen” and “foreigner” juxtapositions work far better than complicated political arguments. These dichotomies, while simplistic, are also highly emotionally charged.

Balibar’s construction of popular movements as created and sustained under the “nation-state” fits well when applied to the Cultural Revolution in China. Mao established China as a Socialist nation, annointed every man, woman and child as a Socialists, and expected ardent, Socialist support. It didn’t matter than the people yearning for change understood the writings of Karl Marx or were keenly aware of the tenets of socialism. What mattered, and what garnered public supports, was the creation of emotionally charged juxtapositions that separated people, first emotionally, and then physically: “Socialist” and “Counter Revolutionary.” “Us” and “them” constructions defined the era, firmly establishing an enemy of the state by not only playing on mass fears of capitalist exploitation, but individual concerns of living up to Mao’s socialist ideal.

Question: If Balibar were to take his argument and apply it directly to China in the late 1960s-1970s, would his conclusions hold up?

Braester’s “Memory at a Standstill”: Historic Truth, the Cultural Revolution, and the film “300″

February 12th, 2010 by vonsteig

I really enjoyed Braester’s piece concerning the film “In the Heat of the Sun.” Most critics and many viewers, it seems, have viewed the film as a poor reconstruction of life during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the film appears to have been dismissed as an unfortunate attempt to color the Cultural Revolution as a nostalgic time, with the horrors and political turmoil dismissed from the historical record. Which brings me to our quote:

“From the very beginning, the film blurs the distinction between history and fiction. While the narrator tells of his experience during the Cultural Revolution, “In the Heat of the Sun” touches on neither that momentous political upheaval nor on the social turmoil of the period. Instead, the film disregards official history and weaves together memory and fantasy.”

This quote summarizes what Braester is trying to get at throughout the piece. Namely, that there is more than one way to tell the story of the Cultural Revolution. Like it or not, many people existed on the fringes of that movement, and not everyone was embroiled in the “political upheaval” or the “social turmoil.” If anything, only re-telling the same history, as barbaric, horrific, and terrifying though it was, does a disservice to those who lived during that time, who’s lives were informed by that struggle, and yet who functioned outside of the movement.

Moreover, the decision to disregard official history in favor of lapsed memory and fantasy was an effective choice. Truth can be derived from completely untruthful events. That is not to say that I endorse a wholehearted attempt at deceiving the reader, i.e. “The Things They Carried,” but an honest attempt at telling historical truth only to by stymied by faulty perceptions and delusions of machismo (as detailed in the diner scene) tells its own sort of truth about the Cultural Revolution and Maohistory.

Interestingly, while reading this review, all I could think about was the film “300,” and the connections between myth, fantasy, selective memory, and varying forms of truth. The film “300″ depicts the Spartan army and their king Leonidas as bastions of freedom and liberty, set to crush the heathens from the far East. The Spartans are depicted as upright and moral, while the Persians are depicted as backward, mystical, engaging in wanton sex and body modifications of the highest order.

And while many people criticized this seemingly racist depiction, everyone seemed to forget that the entire film is being narrated by a warrior attempting to invigorate and motivate an army. We can’t trust anything he says. He is free to run rampant with half-truths and wild inaccuracies. Of course there were no men with saws for hands or multi-legged women clinging to Xerxes, the effeminate leader o the Persians. But it makes for good dehumanization of the enemy, which is exactly what the warrior at the beginning of the film is trying to accomplish. And this attempt to alter history, while not rooted in fact, reveals another kind of truth about these Spartan warriors: they are just as savage, barbaric, and backward as the enemy they intend to defeat.

Likewise, Braester’s reconstruction of “In the Heat of the Sun” depicts a narrative that presents a different version of history that isn’t historically true, but reveals a great deal of personal truth, especially regarding the narrator’s feelings about Maoist “heroism” and the emotional and social baggage that accompanies this political commandment of the Cultural Revolution.

And still a question remains: how is “In the Heat of the Sun” viewed now, in modern China? In the fifteen years since its introduction, how is the film viewed in China today?

Chinese Propaganda Posters: Kids With Guns

February 1st, 2010 by vonsteig

I found almost all of the propaganda posters interesting at some level. Either the subject matter, colors or text were interesting in their own rights. However, the posters that most caught my attention were those in the  “PLA and Children” section. In that section, a specific poster from 1987 caught my eye:

I'm a Little Sailor, 1987, Stefan Landsberger

I'm a Little Sailor, 1987, Stefan Landsberger

It sticks out for obvious reasons. First and foremost, it’s a child holding a loaded AK-47 and smiling. That is enough to stop anyone in their tracks. According to Landsberger, the compiler of all of these propaganda images, images like this were commonplace. Young boys in China were inundated with images of military grandeur, in the hope that they would join the PLA when they came of age. This was a goal shared by both the government and the parents of these young boys.

A career in the PLA was a perfect way for young male recruits to climb the Party ladder and establish themselves both politically and economically. As Landsberger says in his commentary on these posters, “the PLA functioned as one of the main avenues for social mobility.”

This picture in particular is interesting because it glorifies military service in such a way that the viewer is asked to equate the naval ship in the background with the brightly colored flowers in the foreground. This juxtaposition of the man-made and the organic, war and peace, aren’t juxtapositions at all, but rather seen as moral and philosophical  equivalents. The depiction of a child in military garb instead of in the company of a military officer, implies that from an early age, young boys are seen as possible and altogether desirable recruits to the PRC cause.

The use of children in this manner is nothing short of ingenious. Seeing as though this poster was made in 1987, it is apparent that the PRC came to the realization that a new generation of revolutionaries, children with no direct connection to the Maoist movements or the Red Guard, were in need of an intellectual and patriotic indoctrination that was once provided by the real-life churnings of revolution. Without that cultural impetus, the government relied on  these child-centric propaganda posters to do what government-enforced social upheaval used to accomplish so well.

America vs. China: A Battle of Internet Cultures

January 29th, 2010 by vonsteig

For my paper, I’ve decided I want to explore the differing internet cultures in America and China. After watching the “Grass-Mud Horse” video in class, I was struck by its similarity, both in terms of vulgarity and satire, to many American internet “memes.”

A meme, for the uninformed, is, according to Dictionary.com: “A unit of cultural information, such as a cultural practice or idea, that is transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another.” According to Encyclopedia Dramatica, a wiki-website composed of sarcastic, epithet-ridden articles written by internet junkies, has this to say on memes: “Originally used to describe packets of cultural information, it was adopted by the internet to describe viral lulz . . . In short, memes are just inside jokes for people who have no friends with whom to have real inside jokes.”

I wanted to explore this idea. Encyclopedia Dramatica, because it is an American site, has a specific take on what memes are, and to a larger extent, what it means to use the internet as a hub of satirical exchange. The “Rick Roll,” for example, is probably the most prominent American meme. Most commonly, the Rick Roll’er will send a link to a hapless friend, informing them of an interesting/mind-blowing video he or she has found. When the unsuspecting victim clicks on the link, they are greeted not with whatever the Rick Roll’er had led them believe, but instead with a music video of Rick Astley’s “Never Gonna Give you Up.” Classy.

However, I wanted to explore the Chinese side of the coin, and juxtapose my findings. While it appears that Chinese internet culture, most significantly memes, are mostly political in nature, I have stumbled upon a few that were created for no specific reason other than personal enjoyment, but, much like American memes, have caught on and have propelled their creators to unimaginable levels of stardom.

I want to try and find other instances of memes for the sake of memes, if meme-culture revolves solely around political satire, or if there is some middle-ground. By comparing Chinese internet culture with American internet culture, I hope to discover exactly what shapes the online debate in terms of memes, and how both cultures differ in their development, dissemination, and promulgation of internet culture.

Also of note, the Chinese viral video  “Back-Dorm Boys,” beyond providing a good jumping off point for my research, also proves to me that regardless of nationality, heritage, culture or societal norms, college students pay money to ignore doing work at all costs.

Behold: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBlCtqsat…

Also, here’s a link to a pretty controversial video I found in my research: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQw4w9WgX…

China Since 1949: Outline

January 20th, 2010 by vonsteig

Historical Outline, selective though it may be:

1949: The Chinese Communist Party defeated the Nationalists lead by Jiang. The Nationalists escaped to Taiwan, and Mao established himself as the President of China and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP soon grew indistinguishable from civil government. The CCP government was rigidly hierarchical, with a top down power structure. The military was not neutral politically. In fact, members of the PLA were indoctrinated with communist political theory, and were regularly used to enforce CCP programs.

Winter 1949-1950: Mao established an alliance with the USSR and Stalin. Stalin loaned China capital, and urged Mao to intervene in the Korean Conflict and send troops. China diverted resources to the war, at a great fiscal and military loss.

1950: Adoption of the Agrarian Reform Law. Incited the anger of the peasantry. In many instances rich landlords were executed and their large land holdings redistributed.

1950: The Marriage Law. Established, in theory, a society where men and women were equal. Allowed marriage only in instances where both parties agreed, and allowed women to get a divorce. Proved troublesome and tough to implement.

1950’s: The CCP addressed basic health concerns, educational/literary concerns, and the recognition of large minority groups. The CCP also established a new social order. The socialist individual was supposed to be loyal first to the Party, then to the State, then to the Family.

1957: “100 Flowers Campaign.” Invited criticism of the CCP’s policies and initiatives. The harshest critics were labeled “rightists” and forced out. This lead to Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” program in 1958.

1958-1961 – “Great Leap Forward” – reconstituted the peasants into communes, and introduced women into the work force. This program led to growing economic and agricultural problems as the rural areas struggled to conform to Mao’s unrelenting vision. Poor harvest returns were inflated, and a food shortage developed. Led to the “Three Bitter Years,” and Mao’s resignation as president. In 1959, the Dahli Lama was exiled to India prior to a Tibetan uprising. China also split with Russia that year.

1966 – The Cultural Revolution. Mao felt China had strayed from the Socialist path. The formation of Red Guards created a cult of personality around Mao. These groups had the charge to destroy that which was counter to the revolution. There were attacks and beatings of anyone deemed “anti-Maoist.” Mao used this fervor to attack and discredit critics. In 1968, the Red Guard groups began to fight amongst themselves, and in 1969 were recalled. Half a million people died as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

1976 – Mao died. China is a unified, although deeply flawed, state.

1978-1984 – Deng Xiaoping took over leadership of the CCP. Deng Began by pursuing the “Four Modernizations”: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science/technology. Agriculturally, Deng implemented “Free Markets. In 1984, the government allowed certain businesses to function without state intervention. Deng also opened China up for foreign investment. Deng also implemented the “One Child” Policy, a revamp of the 1950 marriage law.

1978-1980’s – Democratic Movement in China. Rural areas were granted free-elections to fill local council positions. Students and intellectuals began demanding more freedoms and increased liberties. In 1988 there were protests across the mainland. These, in turn, led to “Beijing Spring,” mass gatherings in the capital city, marked by student protests and the inclusion of live rock music.

1989 – the massacre at Tiananmen Square resulted after the CCP’s attempt a declaring martial law went unnoticed. Untold thousands were killed by the PLA.

1992 – Jiang Zemin was appointed the new head of state, although Deng remained influential.

1990’s – China began dismantling government run business and supporting free enterprise. Agricultural output, on the other hand, began to dwindle, as people began to seek work on urban centers. Women were often left to the agriculture when husbands left to find work in the cities. When Deng died in 1997, Jiang continued his reforms and reached out to the west. Beautiful Writers, young women writing for a living, increased in popularity. In many ways, the 1990’s brought an infusion of economic and social prosperity unseen in China.

Currently: Some of the problems currently facing China today are environmental concerns, corruption and vice, the CCP’s policy towards religion freer access to education and employment. These issues, although far-reaching, are tolerated by the majority of Chinese citizens because of the booming economy and a resulting nationalism. And yet the CCP may not be able to continue working in secrecy in the face of popular demands for accountability.

In “China since 1949,” the narrative offered is one of a decidedly political nature. Discussions of the inner-workings of the CCP hierarchy come to mind. However, social history, in the form of peasant and Party interaction, and the plight of the working farmer throughout China’s late 20th Century history, is also included. Gender history is also included, albeit sporadically. From the Marriage Law during Mao’s tenure to the urbanized female of the 1990’s making a living by writing romance novels, gender history has definitely colored the narrative. Being such a thin volume, “China Since 1949” does include mentions of minority history, mostly in reference to castigated Muslim communities.

The category I found to be under-represented was the narrative regarding American and Chinese relations. I actually found this lack of detail refreshing, because most discussions of China occur within the confines of American economic relations. A narrative about China kept within the confines of China itself was well appreciated.

The text answers many questions, especially regarding Mao’s differing attempts at implementing a socialist state, the problems his CCP heirs inherited, and how China evolved economically while still maintaining the pretense of a communist state. However, I would like to see more political history developed. There were brief mentions of members of the CCP who dissented from accepted Party wisdom and as a result were forced from their position of power. However, I would be interested to see if there were any of these political dissidents in high positions in the CCP who challenged Mao early on following the 1949 communist revolution.